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Dffirent attitudes and dffirent priorities have made their mark on the
development of social policy in each of the member states of the Community. The
origini of these dffirences lie in history. For example, trade union pressure,
which has boosted provisionfor employed workers, was lacking until recently in
Britain in the yeari following the pbstwar 'nationalisation of welfare'. Fra_nce's
highfamily aliowances follow a preoccupation with population policy, and-Ger'
man emphasis on'national fficiency' has particularly helped employed workers.
Soiial policy is still shaped primarily by national governments. At Commun-
ity level it is puihed into the background by other priorities such 
-as agriculture
and economiZ policy. The main weakness of Community social policy is that it is
barely mentioied ii the Treaty of Rome and lacking this basis, attemp-ts to weld
togeiher dffirent national policies have ended in failure. Instead the Community
now aims at limited social measures which will not encroach on national territory.
A history of differences
Comparisons between Britain and her European
partners have proliferated since we joined the
Community, whether the subject be economic per-
formance, housing density, the price of butter or
consumption of rump steak. These comparisons
often beg a number of questions as well as presum-
ing certain commonly accepted standards and
ideals, such as the belief that the standard of living
can be measured in terms of cars or televisions per
capita. The problem with social policy is that while
many countries would agree on certain basic princi-
ples 
- 
the need to promote full employment, to pro-
tect the disadvantaged and to achieve a fairer dis-
tribution of resources 
- 
they differ greatly in the
order of priority in which they place individual
social policy items. It would be simplistic to say
that Germany, for example, was keen on pensions,
but indifferent to the problems of the poor, and
accordingly slot each country neatly into its
appointed place in a 'Community table'. The pic-
ture is incomplete without also consideing why a
country chooses to spend its social welfare budget
on X rather than Y and the evolution of ideas which
has created these different national policies.
Having said this, it is also fair to add that the
amount of overall social expenditure as a percen-
tage of gross national product does indicate the
attitude of governments to social policies as
opposed to other measures. The Commission's first
European Social Budget (see Further Reading),
which appeared to show that Britain spent less on
social services than any other European country
except Ireland, came as a rude awakening to those
who believed that Britain, the founding father of the
Welfare State, was still a paragon to the rest of
Europe.
Differences in individual social policies between
the various Community countries will be examined
in detail in the following sections. Here it may be
useful to give an overall view of the way in which
different attitudes to social policy in general have
affected the development of social welfare through-
out the member states, and in particular the EEC's
collective attempt to introduce a common social
policy at Community level.
- The differences between one country and another
are not merely technical, not just a question of
whether social policies are paid for by taxation or
contribution, whether the employer rather than the
state carries the heaviest load or whether systems
are simply administered differently. More funda-
mental are the different attitudes to social policy
and the historical and philosophical backgsound
from which they have evolved. In particular, coun-
tries have different conceptions of the relationship
between the state and the individual, and of who
should shoulder the responsibility for what.
Germany and France offer an example of con-
trasting attitudes to social policy. True to its image
in Briiish eyes, Germany puts the emphasis on
policies which will oil the wheels of the national
machine and produce an efficient use of labour.
What is Social policy
This century has seen the expansion of the
Welfare State in all European Community
countries. It has meant an increasing transfer
of responsibility from the individual to the
State such that those services which were
given as charity in Dickensian times are now
understood to be a basic human right. Today
we take it for granted that the State will take
care of all our major social needs: it will sup-
plement the income of those unable to earn
enough; it will provide free education and
medical care; it will offer subsidised housing
to those who cannot afford private accommo-
dation and it will take special care of vulner-
able groups such as the elderly, young children
and handicapped people.
Our expectation of all these services is con-
tinually increasing, but the question how far
should it go is one not only of what countries
can afford but of political attitudes. On the one
hand social policy is seen as providing ser-
vices for those who cannot provide for them-
selves but not discouraging the individual
from standing on his own two feet. On the
other hand, social policy is viewed as a crucial
and continuing process of achieving a re-
distribution of wealth and greater social equal-
ity.
While the State now holds the principal
responsibility for the provision of social ser-
vices, this responsibility is shared between
local and central government. The presence of
the European Community adds a third level to
this structure of shared responsibility and calls
for some new thinking on which aspects of
social policy can best be dealt with at local,
national and European level.
This theme can be traced throughout the course of
this century, resulting in measures which reward
and protect the man at work, but are less concerned
with the very poor or the mother in the home. Simi-
larly, Germany is much keener to pay for retraining
or rehabilitation programmes and work incentives
than for straight unemployment benefit.
French social policy on the other hand tends to
revolve round the family. Even as early as the
nineteenth century, employers began to offer their
workers family allowances. These developed
further during this century, partly as a response to
the promptings of Catholicism, but mainly as a
means of increasing the population and strengthen-
ing the family unit. France in the 1930's had the
lowest birthrate in Europe, a fact which caused con-
tinuing concern even up to recent times, in spite of
the war being waged against the population explo-
sion in the rest of the world. Emphasis on the
importance of the family also encouraged the view
that the elderly and disabled should be cared for
within the family unit rather than at the expense of
the state.
The different background and approaches of
France and Germany illustrate the way in which
very different beliefs as to the nature and purpose of
social policy can evolve even within the limited cul-
tural context of a single continent. Different forces
at work in certain countries have produced an
impact on social policy unheard of elsewhere. In
Britain, for example, we have a highly sophisticated
system of voluntary social welfare agencies which
operate alternatives to state services and which are
powerful in influencing changes in government pol-
icy. This diversity is alien to countries such as
France, where administrative powers are vested
largely in central government. By contrast, the
trade unions in this country have until recently only
marginally influenced social issues, whilst on the
continent they have had a major influence, particu-
larly in the field of employment and retirement
benefits.
A chance to co-operate
Within the context of the European Community,
these various contrasting attitudes are not just
interesting examples of different national charac-
teristics. They place a fundamental question mark
over the future development of Community policy.
While advocates of the European ideal continue to
stress that the Community has much more to offer
than a common market and a customs union, it
remains to be seen whether member states can
move towards a common social policy when many
contrasting national priorities still exist.
When the original six countries signed the Treaty
of Rome in 1957 and thus established the European
Economic Community, social policies were not
uppermost in their minds. References to social
measures in the Treaty are not only vague or impre-
cise, but few and far between. The member states
agreed to "ensure the economic and social progress
of their countries by common action to eliminate
the barriers which divide Europe", but while they
were clear on what economic measures might be
necessary they failed to spell out the means of
achieving social progress. Passing references in the
Treaty to equal pay for women, equivalence of paid
holidays and the improvement of employment
opportunities showed a concern for a social policy
geared only to the worker rather than to the citizen
at large. All in all, there was not much on which to
base a comprehensive social policy, and the vague-
ness of the references made it easier for individual
member states to slide out of agreements when it
actually came to putting promises into practice.
One primary difficulty at the centre of attempts to
formulate a Community social policy has been the
question of harmonisation, or convergence. Indi-
vidual member states guard their own particular
social policies with protective zeal, notjust from
instincts of national pride, but because they are
fully aware of the political sensitivity of social
issues and their influence on the electorate. Refer-
ences to harmonisation of social policies within the
Treaty of Rome were treated with suspicion by the
member states. The Commission initially proposed
various areas where minimum standards might be
established, for example in the field of family allow-
ances and pension age limits, but the Council of
Ministers would hear none of it.
The lack of precision of the Treaty of Rome
together with the Commission's lack of power to
alter the stance of the member states meant that
little progress was made on social policy for the best
part of a decade after the signing of the Treaty.
Such social actions as did take place were more
concerned with keeping economic principles, such
as fair competition and free movement of labour, on
the road, or with patching up the social conse-
quences of economic policies. Reciprocal social
security arrangements for the Community's migrant
workers came into this category. So also did man-
power training under the social field, designed to
pick up the pieces after industrial change had pro-
duced unemployment casualties.
The tide began to turn as people realised that
economic growth caused as many problems as it
solved. Social policy, instead of being a mere after-
thought, was of crucial importance if preventive
action was to be taken. Also, there was growing
scepticism at the coneept of economic growth as an
end in itself. What people wanted was a Community
with more ideological appeal than the customs
union had previously offered.
At the Paris summit meeting in 1972, member
states reaffirmed their concern for social affairs. By
this stage ideas of harmonisation for its own sake
had been pushed out of the picture. Instead the
focus of attention was on an entirely new pro-
gramme, one which would not interfere with
member states' policies, but which would concen-
trate on co-operation and co-ordination in areas
where common problems existed and where a
common solution might be found at Community
level. For example, all countries were having to
cope with the social effects of industrialisation and
economic growth. The Community aimed to inspire
new thinking on the effective use of manpower,
training and retraining, job satisfaction, industrial
democracy and on the improvement of social
benefits. This then has been the new direction of
Community social policy in the last few years.
Unlike agricultural or commercial policy it is not a
substitute for national policies, but rather a forum
for mutual discussion and a springboard for new
ideas.
Vestiges of the desire for harmonisation still
remain, particularly where social policies overlap
with economic goals. The Community's adherence
to the principle of free competition has, for exam-
ple, encouraged it to produce legislation on equal
pay for women, without which disparities between
countries would interfere with the free play of the
market, and discourage them from improving their
social benefits for fear of the economic handicap it
would involve. Social progress is also a goaL of
these policies in that the Commission alms for
upward harmonisation to bring about an overall
improvement in standards throughout the Commun-
itv.
Countries are also achieving a degree of spon-
taneous harmonisation of their own accord. Pres-
tigious national policies tend to rub off on other
countries anxious not to get a reputation for being
mean. Germany, for example, once lagging behind
on family allowances, has recently taken action to
bring this benefit up to the standard of her Euro-
pean partners. Thus although countries still exhibit
their own national preferences, the difference be-
tween levels of expenditure on particular items has
tended to narrow in recent years.
At Community level, social policy still remains
firmly linked to ideas of economic stability and
expansion. For instance, major Community-wide
redistribution of wealth and resources 
- 
the ultimate
goal ofthe Social Fund and the Regional Fund 
- 
has
important social implications in its own right, but it
is no less concerned with the idea that growing
prosperity in Sicily or South Wales will mean that
Welsh miners and Italian agricultural workers can
afford to buy German motor-cars. But although at
present Community social benefits are in many
cases a spin-off from other policies, but this does
not necessarily denigrate their value or mean that
this will always be the way things happen.
This section has been about priorities in social
policy, both of the member states and the Commun-
ity as a whole. It should be clear by now that these
priorities are not immutable, but subject to
evolutionary development and dependent on the
desire of individual countries and Europe as a
whole to achieve social progress. Community
policy, in particular, has over the last few years
illustrated its flexibility and capacity to change.
The next sections describe in detail the social
policy of the Community and particular aspects of
social policy in the member states 
- 
in some areas
Community policy is virtually non-existent, while in
others it plays a valuable role.
The Community's Social Policy
- 
Thg C_oryynu_nity's Social Action Programme covers a wide range of propos-
als in the field of employment, living and working conditions and ind'ustiidl dimo-
cracy. 
.The Programme raises two questions: qre these measures adequate to
meet_the Cqmrytyytity's social needs, and can the Commission get approialfrom
the Council of Ministers for more effective policies? what may bi'needed is a
complete-ly new way of thinking about social policy and the pari it has to play in
the development of the Community as a whole.
The Beginnings
At the Paris Summit of 1972, the Heads of
Government issued the following statement:-
"Economic expansion is not an end in itself. tts
firm aim should be to enable disparities in living
standards to be reduced. It must take place with
the participation of all social partners. It should
result in an improvement of the quality of life as
well as in standards of living". Furthermore 
-
"The Heads of State or Government emphasise
that they attach as much importance to vigorous
action in the social field as to the achievement of
the economic and monetary union.
They invited the Institutions, after consulting
the social partners, to draw up by January 1974a
programme of action providing for concrete
measures and the corresponding resources, pil-
ticularly in the framework of the Social Fund".
This declaration gave the go-ahead for the
development of a comprehensive social policy at
Community level. [n response, the Commission
drew up the first Social Action Programme, planned
to run for three years from 1974 to 1976, and given
Council approval on January 21 1974.
While there had been certain social measures in
the Treaty of Rome, and more especially under the
treaties establishing the European Coal and Steel
Community, the Social Action Programme provides
the major framework for activities in the social
field. It emphasises three key objectives:-
I Full and better employment.I Improvement of living and working condi-
tions.I Greater participation of workers and emp-
loyers in the economic and social decisions
of the Community.
Employment
This was the Community's most deeply felt
commitment. Economic progress was taking its toll
by creating regional inequalities and hitting hard at
sections of industry left behind in the wake bf indus-
trial development, particularly sections of the coal
and steel industry, the textile industry and agricul-
ture. For this reason vocational guidance, training
incentives, retraining and rehabilitation get the
limelight, backed utby the European Ceitre for
Vocational Training, now established in West Ber-
lin. The Centre provides a forum for the exchange
of ideas and information and will help to promote a
common policy on vocational training.
Certain groups of people suffer firsl when unem-
ployment increases and the Social Action Pro-
gramme recognises that women, for example, not
only need better training opportunities, partlcularly
in later life, but also, as a matter of cru-cial impoi-
lance, need backing by the Community in their
battle to get an equal footing with men in the labour
market. It is a question not only of legislation but of
sprgading information and changing attitudes,
which is much more difficult.
Handicapped people are also vulnerable, facing
both psychological pressures and the practical prob-
lem of holding down ajob. Within the Social Attion
Programme the Commission includes both thephys-
ically and mentally handicapped and ouiliies
activities, such as the promotion of better housing,
social services and vocational training, designed not
only to help the handicapped get jobs buf also to
encourage their social integration. However, more
attention has been given to vocational than social
rehabilitation, and to the physically rather than the
mentally handicapped, the latter in both cases pre-
senting a more diffrcult problem.
The European Social Fund
Article 123 of the Rome Treaty says that the
intention of the Social Fund is to help create
employment facilities as well as promoting
geographical and occupational mobility.
Between September 1960, when the Fundfirst started handing out money, and
December 1971, which marked the end of the
first phase of the Fund's activities, it granted
aid worth about f85 million towards financing
schemes of the member governments that
enabled 733,000 workers to be retrained, and
703,000 to receive resettlement grants.
Under the provisions of Article 126 of the
Treaty the rules of the Social Fund could be
reviewed at the end of the transition period,
and in 1969 the Commission put forward
proposals for a reformed Fund 
- 
largely at the
insistence of the trades unions. The new rules
for the Social Fund finally came into operation
in May 1972, and the role changed dramati-
cally from a relatively passive one to a for-
ward looking and dynamic function.
The basic change is that the Fund can now
be used to anticipate change. For five years its
considerably enlarged budget will be split
equally between grants for retraining those
already redundant, and grants for those who
may lose their jobs in the near future due to
such events as rationalisation caused by the
operation of some Community policy or
through advances in technology. Another
major change that is worth noting is that the
Fund can now be used on the Commission's
initiative, with the Council's approval, rather
than having to wait for a government to set up
a scheme for which a grant would then be
sought.
The problems facing migrant workers are discus-
sed in detail later on. While migrants from within
the Community were given certain protection under
agreements on the free movement of workers in the
Treaty of Rome, this left unanswered the question
of what happens to migrant workers from outside
the Community. The Social Action Programme
envisages a number of activities designed to help all
migrants in such:reas as vocational training, hous-
ing, education of children, illegal immigration, and
political rights. These come under the general head-
ing of a Migrant Workers' Action Programme, given
Council approval in February 1976. At present,
under the Social Fund, Community migrants can
get financial help for training and resettlement, but
non-Community migrants have access only to lan-
guage teaching and reception facilities.
In the past few months, the Commission has
become increasingly concerned with the problems
facing young people as jobs become scarcer. It
wants to ensure that the young get better vocational
guidance to gear them to thejobs that actually exist,
and also to create new kinds of jobs especially
appropriate for young people. It has, for example,
been suggested that young people might spend
some time doing community service before going on
to ordinary employment, and that employers might
also be given financial incentives to take on more
young workers. So far, however, these are only
suggestions rather than definite plans of action.
The Social Fund is the most important
mechanism at the Commission's disposal for direct-
ing training and resettlement projects to those areas
and industries where it is most urgently needed, andfor protecting vulnerable groups of workers.
Revamped in l97l it has been opened up increas-
ingly in recent years to incorporate new areas of
need, such as young workers, migrants and the
handicapped, though regrettably it has not always
been given the extra cash needed to cope ade-
quately with the new initiatives.
Assistance under Article 4 of the Fund is availa-
ble where the employment situation is specifically
affected by Community policy or where there is
serious structural unemployment. Help goes to the
textile trade, for example, and to agricultural work-
ers for training for work that will take them off the
land. Handicapped people, migrant workers and
unemployed school leavers are singled out for
special help.
Article 5 of the Fund tackles employment prob-
lems which are only an indirect result of Commun-
ity Policy or which are holding up the 'harmonious
development' of the Community. Aid here goes to
development areas in the poorer regions of the
Community, industries where progress demands a
change in manpower and skills, and industries fac-
ing structural (i.e. permanent) decline. To qualify
for help, projects under Article 5 must be concerned
with either eliminating long term structural em-
ployment, training people who need new qualifica-
tions or integrating people into the work force who
have difficuky finding jobs because of their age.
This applies to men over 50, women over 35, and
young people under 25.1
Small amounts of cash are available under Article
7 to allow for experimental projects which may
come up with new ideas in the field of training and
resettlement.
The kinds of action which qualify for help under
the Social Fund are training and retraining, reset-
tling workers and their families in new areas where
work is available, income maintenance, vocational
guidance and help for disadvantaged workers.
Living and Working Conditions
Once the Social Action Programme moves from
employment to the more general social issues
implicit in the expression 'living conditions', it risks
treading on the sensitive toes of the member states.
Stressing that its aim is in no way to impose a
uniform system of social benefits throughout the
Community, the Commission is nonetheless keen to
see the establishment of certain minimum standards
for social benefits which will have built into them a
regular increase as standards of living improve. The
European Social Budget plays a useful role here. It
is not, as one might expect, a source of money but a
source of information. It consists of statistical
tables comparing social expenditure throughout the
Nine.
The chronic poor have a special place in the
Social Action Programme. While recognising that
member states are primarily responsible for their
care, the Commission believes that it can play a
I A recommendatron to EEC member Govemments to tmprove opportunrtres for voca-
tronaltmrnrng ofyoung people has been provisionallyapproved by the Common Market's
Stmdrng Commltte€ on Employment
The Brussels Commrssron's reseuches have revealed that only between ooe-thlrd and
a half of young people rn Community countnes recerve funher tmrnlng after leavrng
school and thrs makes them more vulneBble than most to cychcal unemployment.
Yoth unemployment (under 25 yeam ofage) rn the Communrty has been rncreasrng
ever srnce 19?0 and between the onset of the recessron rn I 973 and the end of I 975 rt more
than doubled to I 75 nlhon out of a total unemployed In the EEC of some 5 mrlhon
valuable role in coming up with new ideas and solu-
tions, by means of a programme of pilot projects to
combat poverty. The Poverty Programme, which
finally got offthe ground at the end of last year, is
the first example of Community involvement with
social problems not directly related to the work
context. Money has been allocated to schemes such
as family day care centres and community action
projects.
The Social Action Programme also expresses
concern with the social problems of the elderly, but
nothing has been done about this so far.
On the shop floor, there are a number of items in
the field of wages and working conditions which the
Social Action Programme sees as necessary in the
interests both of social progress and of fair competi-
tion. These include the introduction of a forty hour
week and four weeks holiday, equal pay for women
(already approved), and the possibility of introduc-
ing a minimum wage throughout the EEC. Job
enrichment programmes and better safety at work
are two other areas where the Commission plans to
introduce measures to improve working conditions.
The Foundation for the Improvement of Living and
Working Conditions, which is soon due to go into
action in Dublin, will be the Commission's instru-
ment for carrying out research in these fields and
for coming up with ideas for Community policy in
the long term.
More ambitious proposals under this heading of
the Social Action Programme include co-ordination
of certain aspects of public health throughout the
member states and plans for social housing, but
there are no signs of action at the moment.
lndustrial democracy
The Social Action Programme contains only part
of the total Community activity in this area, respon-
sibility for which is shared between two Commis-
sion departments 
- 
Social Affairs and Internal Mar-
ket. Within the Social Action Programme the
Commission lays particular stress on the impor-
tance of joint discussions between both sides of
industry, member governments and itself. Specific
proposals include a directive on mass dismissals
(already approved by the Council) and a directive to
protect workers in the event of mergers and take-
overs. The Commission also has the idea of setting
up a European Trade Union Institute (independent,
but financed by the Community) to train union
members in Community affairs.
Achievements
Of the exhaustive list of activities under the
Social Action Programme, the following proposals
have so far been agreed.1. Assistance from Article 4 of the European
Social Fund for migrant workers and hand-
icapped workers.2. Initial Action Programme for handicapped
workers.3. Directive to implement the principle of equal
pay for equal work between men and women.4. The establishment of a Centre for Vocational
Training.5. The overall application of the principle of the
forty hour week and four weeks annual paid
holiday between now and 1978.6. Directive on the harmonisation of the member
states' laws on mass dismissals.7. The setting up of a European General Safety
Committee for Industry and the extension of
the powers of the Mines Safety and Health
Committee.8. The creation of a European Foundation for the
Improvement of the Environment and Living
and Working Conditions.9. Pilot programmes to combat poverty.
10. Publication of the first Social Budget.
11. Use of the Social Fund to assist in restructur-
ing the economy to assist unemployed school-
leavers and young workers.
12. Coordination of member states' employment
policies and improvement of analysis and
forecasting of the labour market.
13. Directive on equal treatment for men and
women at work.
14. Experimental projects to help solve the hous-
ing problems of the handicapped.
Other proposals are already on the Council's
desk and some have yet to be drafted. A few ofthe
thornier issues, which are either short of govern-
ment support or financial resources, appear to have
been quietly and conveniently forgotten. Mean-
while the Commission is faced with the task of
drafting new ideas as to what happens next 
- 
the
current programme expires at the end of this year.
A Critical Perspective
Community social policy has not had a smooth
passage in recent times, in spite of the enthusiasm
and conviction which brought the Social Action
Programme into being. Criticism varies from the
view that the Programme is too idealistic, ignoring
political realities and biting off more than it can
chew, to the opposite idea that it fails to go far
enough.
The main problem facing social affairs has been
the changing economic climate. The summit of '72
was a time of prosperity in the EEC and of conse-
quent optimism, but codntries lack the political will
to follow through Community policies in times of
recession, when they are faced with pressing prob-
lems at home. Regrettably social policy is often the
first to suffer 
- 
lacking a firm basis in the Treaties it
is viewed by some as an expensive luxury, particu-
larly by countries such as Germany, which appears
to pay the highest contribution for it.
It is ironic that while a Community social policy
may have to rely on times of prosperity in order to
flourish, it is in the lean years that it is most needed,
to combat the increasing problems of poverty,
unemployment and other social ills. While suppor-
ters of the Community's social policy such as Dr.
Patrick Hillery, Commissioner for Social Affairs,
have hotly defended the Social Action Programme
and its relevance to the current situation, it has also
been criticised for adhering to principles of 1972
which are out of date in the present time and for
lacking the flexibility to adapt to new needs in times
of crisis.
One of the reasons why social policy has been
ineffective is lack of money. Finance ministers have
yet to accept the importance of social measures.
Unless social policy gets an adequate vote under
the Community budget, instead of being squeezed
out by expenditure on the CAP, it will always
occupy a peripheral position as the Community's
poor relationr.
I The total Comunity budget in 1975 mounted to 6,754 mrlhon unrts of account. The
Sclal Fund Budgetforthe same penod was 433 mrllion unltsofaccount(6.4 per cent of
total). Th$ compares wlth m Agnculture budget rn 195 of 5,M4 mrlhon units of account(74.5 per cent of total) ( lu a = f0.42)
The effectiveness of social measures has also suf-
fered at the hands of individual countries, which do
not always adhere strictly to the rules of implemen-
tation. In particular, grants from Community funds
have a tendency to be used as national governments
see fit, which is not always in the way the Commis-
sion intended the money to be spent. The British
Government has tended to view the Social Fund as
a means of making savings in existing government
expenditure, rather than releasing extra funds for
additional initiatives in the field of training and
resettlement.
Social affairs is still an area where the Commis-
sion has to battle for acceptance with the member
states, as recent meetings of the Council of Social
Affairs Ministers illustrate. In June 1975,the major
proposals awaiting Council decision were Social
Fund intervention to help young people and indus-
tries particularly affected by the crisis, proposals
for a forty hour week and four weeks holiday, the
Poverty Programme and equal treatment for women
at work. By the time these issues had run the Coun-
cil gauntlet, the Poverty Programme had been
reduced from a possible five years to two, the
implemerrtation of four week's holiday had been
postponed until the end of 1978, and a decision on
equal treatment for women was put off until the
next meeting, while the Commission's suggestions
for tackling discrimination regarding social security
benefits had to be crossed off altogether.
Even after the next Social Affairs Council in
December 75, member states were still arguing
about crisis intervention by the Social Fund, each
country claiming that its own worst hit industry
should be the one to qualify for aid, and so produc-
ing a stalemate. Measures to provide equal treat-
ment for women finally got through in December,
though in a weakened form.
The rift between Commission and Council and
the wrangling of member states does not encourage
an optimistic view of the future of social policy.
How then can these problems be effectively tack-
led?
As with many other areas of Community policy,
the progress of social affairs ultimately depends on
the achievement of a new working relationship be-
tween the Commission and the Council. While the
Council uses its power to restrain rather than
encourage social policies, no radical development
can take place. The Community is then simply a
forum for mutual discussion rather than a force for
change. To combat the reluctance and hostility of
national governments, civil servants and politi-
cians, the Commission needs to canvass much more
widely for public support for its policies. It will only
shake off its powerless image when ordinary people
begin to have some sense of involvement with what
is going on in Brussels. The backing of public sup-
port will in turn give the Commission much more
bargaining power with the member states.
More important than these steps to reallocate
influence and decision-making power is the need for
completely new thinking on the purpose of social
policy in relation to the Community's other goals.
Social policy must no longer be seen as dependent
on economic growth, as a gesture that the Commu-
nity can only afford to make when times are good.
On the contrary, social and economic policy should
together be the foundation for a policy of growth
which will ensure a fairer distribution of the Com-
munity's resources.
much existing housing throughout the Community
is in poor condition, a fact which most member
states now recognise and are in the process ofput-
ting to rights.
Britain comes off well in housing comparisons,
particularly if hygiene facilities, including the
number of baths, flush toilets and piped water are
taken as a measure of quality. There is a higher
percentage of homes with bathrooms in Britain than
anywhere else in the Community (see tables). Our
building rates have been slightly lower than the
European average, but we compare well on many
other points. For example, Britain has a larger than
average number of rooms in each home, her older
property is in better condition, and there is a higher
ratio of houses to flats even in urban areas. Fur-
thermore the scale and quality of the British public
housing sector is hard to beat. Continental coun-
tries are already catching up, however. Many coun-
Housing
The would-be British home-hunter, dogged until recently by soaring costs of
bought and rented accommodation, and still facing severe housing shortages,
may raise an incredulous eyebrow at the idea that housing standards have
improved appreciably in recent years and that the British track record is better
than many of our European partners. Nevertheless this is the case, or was until
the oil crisis hit the European building industry. How toface continued demand
for housing at minimum cost is a problem the entire Community now has toface.
Changing Patterns
Between 1960 and 1970 the provision of houses
improved considerably throughout the EEC, helped
not only by expanding building programmes but
also by falling birth rates. Pressure on housing still
persisted, partly because the steady flow of people
from the land to the town made it hard for urban
housing programmes to make any appreciable
headway; partly because of regional imbalances;
and partly because of increasing divisions in the
family unit. (The tendency for elderly relatives and
unmarried children to live in separate accommoda-
tion means more homes with fewer people in them.)
While the overall record for building new homes
has been quite good this does not mean that Euro-
pean housing is now plentiful. Some countries have
previously had a very poor housing record and have
been making up lost ground. A rapid building pro-
gramme in the Netherlands, for example, was the
only answer to severe housing shortages. Also,
tries have overtaken Britain as regards owner occu-
pation and more homes with a larger number of
rooms are being built. One area where Britain has
fallen badly behind is in providing direct housing
benefits to families in greatest need.
Crisis
While housing statistics vary from country to
country, it is very evident that the oil crisis of 1973
put all the member states into difficulties with their
housing programmes. Everywhere building costs
soared (a conservative estimate puts the increase at
at least 23 per cent for 1974 alone), mortgage rates
went up, and investors, once ready to empty their
pockets for a deal they thought they were sure to
profit by, suddenly began to look on housing specu-
lation as a much more risky venture. The result was
not only that housing programmes began to topple,
but that workers in the building industry were par-
ticularly badly hit by unemployment. Most member
states have tried to protect housing from the free
play of the market by increasing capital allocations
and trying to stabilise building prices and mortgage
rates. But this makes large demands on the national
purse and in spite of it, the ailing building industry
has been slow to respond to treatment.
For some countries, particularly Ireland and the
Netherlands, the recession came just when they
were about to find the answer to some of their most
acute housing problems.The danger of a substantial
drop in the proportion of homes to people is a real
one for the future. The need for careful husbandry
of resources is more apparent than ever as countries
are forced to pick anil-choose between alternative
priorities. [n general the answer has been much
greater selectivity. Countries have responded to the
crisis by cutting back on new building in the public
sector and concentrating resources where the need
is greatest, i.e. housing for the elderly, the disabled,
large families and migrant workers. Housing
benefits have been made more specific, for example
by means of rent allowances, rather than indis-
criminate general subsidies. Modernisation of older
property now plays a key role in housing program-
mes, with new building reserved for priority needs.
It has been argued that the restrictions which hous-
ing policies have had to face could have the
unlooked-for advantage of promoting greater
rationalisation. A sensitivity to specific housing
needs could be more valuable in the long term than
the previous tendency towards inadequately plan-
ned building programmes.
Several countries, Belgium, Denmark an{ France
for example, have developed new building pro-
grammes which focus attention on low-cost housing
alongside a general modernisation programme for
older property. lreland has fought hard, with large
increases in government finance, to keep up the
level of new building programmes, but is still find-
ing it hard to meet its financial requirements. Both
Germany and the Netherlands have taken specific
steps to combat unemployment in the building
industry. For the Netherlands the problem is par-
ticularly severe, owing to the very rapid housing
expansion prior to the oil crisis, which drew many
workers into the building industry.
The increase in housing construction fell away
sharply after 1973 and in addition hygiene and com-
fort standards in large numbers of existing houses
began, according to public opinion, to drop. (This
may have something to do with raised expectation
of housing among the general public, which remains
largely unaffected by economic crises.) However,
modernisation, as a valuable answer to housing
shortages, has grown in popularity since 1973 and
as well as improving sanitation and general housing
conditions it has provided scope for countries to go
ahead with energy-saving insulation programmes.
In addition, the trend towards modernisation has
not only provided work for unemployed building
workers, but has also encouraged countries to
rethink their policies of urban renewal. Belgium, for
example, has in the past faced loud protests when
houses have been demolished and new, higher-class
housing built on the same site. The residents,
unable to face the increased costs have been forced
to move away. Modernisation has a major advan-
tage over demolition and new building in that it does
not run the risk of destroying the existing structure
and way of life of the community.
Further efforts on the part of governments to
cushion householders from the effects of the reces-
sion include rent freezes in Belgium, Italy and the
UK, controlled increases in Denmark and Luxem-
bourg and improved rent subsidies in the Nether-
lands. In spite of gestures such as these, however,
there remain certain groups of people particularly
hard hit by the housing shortage. Migrant workers
tend in any case to occupy the poorest housing, and
handicapped people, whose chances of rehabilita-
tion ancl social integration often depend on good
housing, are also badly affected. The EEC Com-
mission is itself taking action to improve the hous-
ing conditions of these two groupst.
Looked at broadly, the housing problems of
recent years have also had a significant effect on
overall planning policy. Countries have taken
action to even out regional and urban/rural imbal-
ances, as well as attempting to reduce the social
disparities between housing for the rich and housing
for the poor. The trend which stands out from
others, however, is the desire to bring private
speculation within bounds and assume tighter gov-
ernmental control of development. Increased power
has been invested in the local authorities in
Denmark, Ireland and France for example, and Bri-
tain's radical Community Land Act is only one of a
number of steps taken by member states in this
direction.
I Eillier thrs year for exmple rt approved a gmnt of !187,500 for a number of pilot
*hemes and studies which mll investigate the specific housing needs of hmdicapped
people (acess rmps, kitchen md bathroom facilities and so forth). Note that the
Commission has hnle direct power rn rclation to housing. Only in the ese of the ECSC
with its more extenslve mmdate has dlrect actlon been possible. The ECSC has
part-fimnced the constructlon of about 125,000 houses for coal md steel worken.
Socia! Security
Looking at the statistics, it would appear that Britain has been losing ground
fast in the socialwelfare race. But in some ways the British system has more to
offer than other EEC countries, for it distributes resources more evenly. In princi-ple it remains true that while British benefits provide a more effective safety net
for the poor, the continental approach takes better care of the ordinary working
man and his family.
Patchwork of systems
The reasons for general nervousness at the pros-
pect of harmonisation become clear after a detailed
look at the various social security schemes operat-
ing throughout the member states. The picture is a
bewildering patchwork of different national
priorities, different administrative systems and dif-
ferent methods of finance.
One thing is clear however: Britain, pioneer of
the Welfare State, has now fallen badly behind on
social expenditure. The most generous countries-
Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg and the Nether-
lands 
- 
spend about a third of their national income
on social expenditure. Belgium, France and Italy
spend over a quarter and only the UK and Ireland
spend less than this (see tables). The order changes
slightly if social expenditure is measured per head
of population, but the UK is still near the bottom.
(1975 figures in all the tables are projected esti-
mates).
The rate of growth in social spending is also a
useful indicator. In recent years social expenditure
in all countries has risen faster than the increase in
national income, illustrating the continued expan-
sion of national social protection policies. Levels of
benefit have been raised, more people have been
included and more categories of need have been
covered. There are, however, substantial variations
from country to country in the rate of increase rela-
tive to increase in national income. Between 1970
and 1975 Britain stands out as having a slow rate of
growth in this respect.
Differences in national priorities emerge clearly
when total national social expenditure is broken
down into its separate components. In all countries
pensions take pride of place, followed by sickness
benefits. Then priorities divide between family
benefits (in Belgium, Denmark, France and lreland)
and invalidity (in the rest of the EEC). These four
items together take the lion's share of the social
security budget, but the relationship between each
of them is gradually changing. Pensions for example
are becoming less important in the Netherlands and
Germany, but growing in importance particularly in
Belgium, France and Italy. Sickness benefits on the
other hand seem to be attracting more expenditure
in Belgium, France, Denmark, Germany and Lux-
embourg. As might be expected, expenditure on
unemployment benefit has increased dramatically
throughout the EEC. In Belgium and Ireland it is
estimated as representing around 8 per cent of all
benefits inl975, while in Denmark, the Netherlands
and the UK it is estimated at above 5 per cent.
Paying for it all
Another key area of contrast between member
states relates to the question of finance. Countries
fall into two groups depending on whether their
main source of income comes from the state and
local authorities or from employers' and workers'
contributions. Denmark and Ireland rely directly on
the state whereas France, Germany, Italy and the
Benelux countries (the original six, in fact) depend
on contributions. Britain hovers midway between
the two groups, the two main sources of finance
being of more or less equal importance. In every
member state workers' contributions are less than
employers' contributions, often substantially so,
but it is significant that on the continent contribu-
tions are earnings related rather than flat rate and
with the increased (compulsory) participation of
higher income groups have grown more akin to
direct income tax.
Sources of revenue for social security and medical care 1972
Sources of revenue _;ifi:J *"
insured employers authorities other
Belgium 20 46 30 4Germany 24 50 23 3Fr4nce 20 62 16 2Italy 15 54 24 7Luxembourg 24 36 31 9Netherlands 36 43 13 8
uK1834408Ireland 14 19 66 IDenmark 6 l0 8l 3
Source: European Commission, Report on the development on
the social situation in the community in 1975.
The pattern of expenditure which emerges from
the collection of statistics illustrates the general
trend of national policies, but this is only half the
picture. Many key factors affecting social security
do not come to light in the figures. Firstly there is
the contrast between selective and universal
benefits. While some countries spread their benefits
thinly over the entire population, others ure more
generous but more discriminating. Britain has,
since Beveridge, upheld the principle of com-
prehensive cover, while in general the continent, at
least until recently, looked on social security more
as social insurance. Qualifying conditions were
more restrictive than in Britain and certain groups
were not entitled to benefits. While employees were
protected the self-employed tended to be excluded
from compulsory cover. This represented a large
gap in coverage as the self employed in the 1950s
represented nearly a third of the continental work-
ing population, compared with only 7.5 per cent in
Britain. [n Germany the higher paid were also left
out of the picture as a result of an incomes ceiling
above which people were not entitled to compul-
sory insurance. In recent years, however, the vari-
ous excluded groups have gradually been brought
into the fold, with the result that continental
systems are drawing closer to Britain in their
comprehensiveness.
The contrast between flat-rate and earnings-
related benefits also plays an important part in
influencing the texture of social security provision
and the redistribution of wealth. Taking pensions as
an example, while the British state scheme has up
to now favoured a flat-rate benefit, pensions on the
continent, with the exception of Denmark and the
Netherlands, have stuck more closely to the earn-
ings related principle. In most countries there are a
complex variety of special schemes which, far from
redistributing wealth, tend to preserve occupational
status by discriminating in favour of certain groups.
Civil servants do particularly well. In Britain, how-
ever, discrimination and inequality enter the system
via the private occupational pension schemes. Con-
tinental sickness, unemployment and maternity pay
are also more closely linked to earnings levels than
in Britain, the aim being to preserve usual earnings
as far as possible rather than setting a basic mainte-
nance level. Unemployment benefit in France is
now 90 per cent ofthe previous year's earnings for
the first 12 months out of work.
In spite of all these considerations it remains a
fact that Britain comes off badly in the welfare race
in terms of both overall expenditure and on many
individual items. It is mainly on health care that the
statistics fail to do justice to the UK, because they
are based on current expenditure and ignore the
vast capital cost of the health service.
Moving closer
For the moment, national social security policies
remain strikingly different from one another,
whether it is a question of social principles or
methods of applying these principles. Nevertheless
there are areas where countries are beginning to
assume common objectives. Most countries are
moving towards broader social security coverage
which will plug the gaps where social protection is
not available. They are also attempting to raise the
level of benefits, bringing them more into line with
rising wages and increased prosperity. Several
countries are trying to make benefits fairer 
- 
for
example, Italy and Luxembourg have taken steps to
bring their various pension schemes into line. There
are also moves afoot to rationalise social security
systems, bearing in mind that in many countries
they are even more complex and varied than in
Britain. In addition, particular groups of people
have been the focus of attention in several coun-
tries, showing a common recognition of need.
Women have benefited in Belgium, France, Lux-
embourg and the UK, as have disabled people in
Belgium, Germany and the UK.
But the most crucial problem which all countries
have had to face since 1973 is the economic crisis
and the consequent inflation/unemployment spiral.
While the need for generous benefits to offset the
effects of the crisis have become more acute, the
financial wherewithal to provide them has been
running dry. Countries have reacted by concentrat-
ing on the least privileged categories and the most
pressing needs while at the same time readjusting
financial burdens and spreading reforms over a
period of time.
The joint attack to combat unemployment has
taken different forms throughout the Community.ln 1974 Germany introduced new machinery to
guarantee workers an income of equal value to their
wages over the last three months of work in the
event of an enterprise going bankrupt. France also
agreed a scheme which with state financial aid gives
workers a year's redunduncy pay at almost the level
of their previous earnings. Last year Italy intro-
duced guaranteed wages for people laid off or on
short time working, Belgium brought in interim
pensions for elderly workers, France and Luxem-
bourg improved compensation for partial unem-
ployment and the Netherlands proposed a scheme
io give elderly workers unemployment benefits for
an unlimited period. Several countries relaxed con-
ditions of eligibility and raised the level of benefits,
as well as extending cover and bringing in special
measures to help young people.
Inflation has put certain groups of the population
in a particularly vulnerable position. Countries have
reacted by raising the level of benefits, sometimes
by very ldrge amounts. In 194 Belgium introduced
a systeh to give a guaranteed income to people with
no other adequate means of subsistence; Germany
took special action on the handicapped; France and
Italy improved minimum old age benefits; and [re-
land and the UK raised the level of all basic
benefits. (In the UK the increase was 30 per cent for
long-term cash benefits, the largest ever made.) The
Netherlands on the other hand took action to
reduce contributions. These various activities were
developed further in 1975.
While the expansion of benefits goes on, coun-
tries are still searching for ways of paying for them.
In the past period of economic prosperity maintain-
ing financial equilibrium was not so difficult, butlhe
present crisis has made this an urgent problem. The
tlilemma is exacerbated by the changing ratio of
working to elderly people in the Community which
means fhat there are increasingly more beneficiaries
and fewer contributors (see plie l7).
Faced with this problem, Community countries
have come up with a variety of solutions, such as
increasing contributions and taxation; rationalising
their benefit systems; redistributing costs and bor-
rowing money. Ultimately, however, the policy of
exqaniion of social security must suffer and some
major compromise may have to be reached between
soCial prioiities and financial means. Whether this
will lead to renewed emphasis on selective benefits
and restricted eligibility or whether it will entail
other methods of provision, such as preventive
measures and moie community services, still
remains to be seen.
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Health
While many feel we still have cause to be proud of our National Health
Service, it is useful to see how it compares with other countries. The main differ-
ence involves the question of financing, with varying burdens being placed on the
tax payer, the employer, the employee and the patient himself. The rapidly
escalating costs of health care provision have made all countries anxious to
improve the efficiency of their systems, but this is easier said than done.
Belgium
The chequered history and divided culture of
Belgium have left their mark on the development of
health care services. The resulting system, an
incohesive service with relatively little state con-
trol, is anything but systematic. Although central
government in Brussels is responsible for most
decision making, much of the responsibility for
carrying out policy is in the hands of some 2,000
local authorities, and this decentralisation does not
make administration easy. Added to this the gov-
ernment has also to take account of many different
interest groups within its borders 
- 
the Flemish,
French and German subcultures, the strong Roman
Catholic element, and the pressures of a high per-
centage of immigrants and elderly people in the
population.
The present system of supplying and paying for
medical care in Belgium works as follows: about 98
per cent of the population are covered by compul-
sory health insurance, and their contributions are
paid via the government to the various sickness
funds. These sickness funds are responsible for
reimbursing patients and fixing the fees doctors can
charge. The patient has to pay the doctor first, and
then is paid back from the sickness fund, but this
reimbursement usually covers only three-quarters
of the cost of treatment. In the case of hospital
treatment however, a patient usually gets all his
money back. Doctors are paid a fee for their ser-
vices rather than a fixed salary.
While nearly everyone is thus covered by medical
insurance, the main problem Belgium faces at the
moment is to make the service more efficient.
Rapidly escalating costs of health care have not
been helped by the fact that services are not ration-
ally planned, producing too many doctors, too few
nurses, and an uneven geographical distribution of
hospital beds. The Government is taking steps to
improve the situation but the main stumbling block
- 
the medical profession itself 
- 
still has to be over-
come. The doctors have a powerful influence in the
development of Belgian health care, but a vested
interest in keeping things the way they are. They
see health care as the responsibility of the indi-
vidual and resist attempts by the state to rationalise
the system, if this means restricting the personal
freedom of the profession.
Denmark
The tale of the Danish health service is one of
increasing state control, resulting in a system which
bears many similarities to our own National Health
Service. Increased power has been vested in the
local authorities, and now fourteen counties (equi-
valent to the UK regional health authorities) are
largely responsible for the executive and opera-
tional functions of the health service. The national
government's role is that of policy maker and
supervisor, but it is still at present directly respon-
sible for psychiatric hospitals and institutions for
special groups, such as the blind, the deaf,
alcoholics and mentally handicapped people.
Interestingly enough, the state also controls the
price and distribution of pharmaceuticals, to the
extent of running all the chemists' shops.
While the British health service offers blanket
protection, not all Danish people are entitled to
completely free health care. There is one level of
benefit for the 80 per cent of people whose income
falls below a certain point, and another for the
second group whose income is above it. People in
the former group are entitled to free medical care
from state-approved GP's and specialists and free
choice of doctor among those approved. If they
choose an unapproved doctor they are entitled only
to a proportion of the fees. People in the latter
group get a refund equal to that of the first group's
benefits, the difference being that doctors can
charge them higher fees, (otherwise doctors are
paid a set amount by the state, half their fees being
paid on a per capita basis, and the other half on a
fee-for-service basis). Groups I and 2 both get free
treatment in public and other approved hospitals,
and counties are obliged by law to provide a free
hospital service to a reasonable standard. Counties
also pay three-quarters of the cost of medicines.
There is virtually no private hospital service in
Denmark. The Danish system seems to operate
more smoothly and harmoniously than in many
countries. One reason for this may be the even
geographical distribution and abundant supply of
doctors 
- 
163 per 100,000 people compared with 133
per 100,000 in England and Wales (in 1972).
France
Two characteristics stand out in the French
health system: a degree of state intervention which
is minimal by British standards, and a financial
framework which places heavier burdens on the
patient than anywhere else in the Community.
The system of compulsory health insurance is
complex. Over 90 per cent of the population are
covered by compulsory insurance, more than 70 per
cent within the general scheme, and others by
special schemes for such groups as civil servants,
miners and agricultural workers. However, the spe-
cial schemes do not always cover all risks, so some
people belong to both groups. Many of the self-
employed are excluded altogether. This compulsory
insurance only covers a proportion of the patient's
costs, which are determined by a complex
mechanism known as the 'ticket mod6rateur'. This
sets the amount the patient will have to contribute.
It may be a proportion or a lump sum, and varies
according to the standard and type of treatment 
-
consultations, medicines, hospitalisation, and so
forth. In general, compulsory insurance covers
about three-quarters of the cost of treatment, but,
with the exception of hospital care, the patient has
to pay first and is then reimbursed, which can
t0
involve costly bridging finance. As far as the
remaining quarter of the cost is concerned, the
patient has to pay out of his own pocket or from
private insurance. The poor are covered by sup-
plementary benefit.
In practice the burden the patient has to bear can
be heavier than this, owing to the precarious
method of fixing fees. It is up to the sickness funds
which administer health insurance to determine fees
with doctors in each locality, so costs can vary con-
siderably from place to place. The sickness funds
tend to be weak negotiators, but since 1971 the state
has made efforts to bring the situation under control
by imposing national agreements and tariff ceilings.
If doctors and sickness funds fail to agree, the state
can intervene and establish official fee scales. In
spite of this system, not all doctors have toed the
line, and patients can find themselves paying fees at
one rate but being refunded at another.
Quite apart from the problem of fixing fees, there
is also very little state control over the standard and
quality of health care within a largely privately
operated system. One major problem is poor geo-
graphical distribution of resources. While the gov-
ernment is beginning to take action to achieve a
better distribution of hospital beds, it can do almost
nothing about the acute regional imbalance of doc-
tors. In 1968-9 there were 367 doctors per 100,000 in
Paris, compared with 6G70 per 100,000 in the pro-
vlnces.
The rapidly rising costs of health care, which all
countries face, are now beginning to tax the French
system to the limits, with the sickness funds
threatened with insolvency. The government will
have to use its financial powers to intervene, but
increasing contributions and redistributing costs is
not an easy business. At present employers make a
very high contribution to the sickness funds 
- 
more
than three times the amount contributed by em-
ployees 
- 
so they will not welcome any heavier bur-
den, but nor for that matter will employees.
Germany
Germany operates a health care system which is
lavish by any standards, with very high doc-
tor/patient and nurse/patient ratios, plenty of the
latest medical equipment and hospital beds to
spare. The patient is covered by health insurance
and has very few extra costs to bear. There are no
waiting lists for admission to hospital, no pressures
to discharge people, and doctors are among the best
paid professions in the country. Understandably
however, even the Federal Republic cannot survive
the ever escalating costs which this system brings
with it.
The standard method of increasing revenues is to
raise the level of contributions to health insurance
funds, but contributors are beginning to protest at
having to shoulder this burden while attempts to
control costs remain inadequate. Employees' insur-
ance contributions now amount to over 10 per cent
of their salary, with employers contributing an
equal amount. 90 per cent of the population are
covered under the official insurance system; 8.5 per
cent are private patients, and a few are covered by
special schemes or not insured at all. People with
incomes above a certain limit are not obliged to
contribute, but can do so voluntarily. Under the
official system patients are entitled to almost 100
per cent free medical care and although they do
have to pay prescription charges, these are low rela-
tive to average salaries.
The government has made attempts to save
money and reduce patient demand by proposing
higher prescription charges, and operating a 'no
claims bonus' for the insured, but the health cost
explosion still continues. This is partly due to
increasing demands on the system, but the costs
which people protest about are the very high doc-
tors' fees which the insurance funds pay, and the
wasteful duplication of services caused by the divi-
sion between treatment in hospital and treatment in
doctors' surgeries. There is no interrelationship or
continuity of care between hospital and GP ser-
vices. The two systems are run by entirely different
staff with no overlapping of responsibility. This
means that each time a patient leaves or enters hos-
pital, he must be re-examined by a different doctor.
The resulting duplication of equipment and wastage
of manpower is considerable. Because of the
absence of out-patient departments, patients have
to be fully admitted to hospital for relatively minor
treatment, and often stay there for longer than
necessary.
Legal and financial state intervention is increas-
ing in Germany, as elsewhere, in order to even out
the inequalities of the system and avert a financial
crisis, but the government faces strong opposition
from doctors and patients, both of whom have
much to gain from preserving the status quo 
- 
the
doctors because they do not want to sacrifice their
high salaries, the patients because they ?t p{esent
enjoy a very generous service. On the other hand,
the government is under pressure to take action
from the general public, who are not prepared to
accept high rises in insurance contributions.
lreland
General poverty has hampered the development
of a national health service in Ireland but radical
changes have been implemented in recent years
which have cemented the foundation of a state ser-
vice. There has been a gradual move towards uni-
versal benefits, though free medical care is still not
considered a right to which the whole population
should be entitled. Eligibility for benefits still
depends on income, and while 90 per cent of the
population can now obtain free hospital services,
only about a third can as yet obtain free treatment
from GP's. For those not fully covered, the gov-
ernment encourages voluntary health insurance
administered through a government appointed Vol-
untary Health Insurance Board. Private health
insurance companies also operate but are not
allowed to compete with the VHIB.
Administration of health services was, until 1971,
almost entirely in the hands of local government,
but since then has been dealt with by eight newly-
established regional health boards. Financial
responsibility has been increasingly shouldered by
central government, with more than half of health
care costs now coming from general taxation. The
Irish Hospitals Derby Sweepstake used to cover
nearly all capital expenditure on hospitals, but now
contributes to only a fifth of these costs. As the
situation is still one of change and development, it is
too early to comment on the advantages or disad-
vantages of the system.
Italy
While there are frequent rumblings in Italy of a
major reorganisation of health care in the direction
of the British NHS, the present system has been
openly described as chaotic. Devolutionary meas-
ures of the early 1970s have ensured the necessary
regional administrative structure for the provision
ofhealth care, but the system founders on the rocks
of financial adminstration. Instead of a similar
delegation of financial responsiblity, a separate cen-
tral organisation is still responsible for the varied
network of insurance institutions, some 200 of
them, which provide 94 per cent of the population
with compulsory cover.
There are proposals for merging the sickness
funds into a single social security fund, but mean-
while the present system continues. The various
sickness funds, which are run on a commercial and
actuarial basis, have different contribution rates
and different benefits. Each fund competes for its
own doctors, and establishes its own rates of fees
with them. The largest Fund, INAM, pays for
medical care direct, but under some other funds,
the patient pays and is then reimbursed. Hospital
cover under most funds only lasts for 180 days,
after which the poor can be paid for by the state (but
may have to move hospital) while those with more
resources must resort to private means. Most hospi-
tals are independent, and the sickness funds take
out contracts with them for beds, though there
appear to be frequent arguments about fees. In spite
ofthe general shortage of beds it is not unknown for
hospitals to close owing to lack of finance.
As a rule, doctors in hospitals are on a salary,
which may be boosted by private work using hos-
pital facilities, but doctors outside hospitals are paid
in a variety of ways, depending on negotiations with
the sickness funds. The usual systems are a capita-
tion fee or a fee for service, or a mixture of both,
but some specialists are paid by the hour. More
recently, the sickness funds have tried to get fees
fixed at national level in order to rlnify the system.
While most Italians are covered by compulsory
insurance, there is little faith in the standard of
medicine that this cover provides. Private practice
therefore thrives, but at high cost to the patient.
Netherlands
While the health care system in most European
countries seems to point to the advantages of state
control, this is less true of the Netherlands, where
an almost entirely private system operates effi-
ciently and to the satisfaction of its inhabitants.
Both insurance cover and provision of care are
run on a private basis, with the patients, the insur-
ers and the providers of care free to bargain on
prices and benefits within certain constraints laid
down by law. Doctors' fees are, in fact, fixed by
negotiations between the medical profession and
the joint Association of Sickness Fund Organisa-
tions on a per capita basis, or, in the case of
specialists, a fee-for-service basis.
Compulsory insurance covers 70 per cent of the
population. The remaining (wealthy) 30 per cent
may either contribute to public funds or take out
their own private insurance. The various sickness
funds offer free comprehensive cover for the nor-
mal run of medical treatment 
- 
consultations, hos-
pitalisation, medicines, and so forth 
- 
and usually
payfor medical care directly than on arefund system.
The hospital system, like the rest of Dutch medi-
cal care, is run largely on a private basis. though
hospitals are forbiclden by law to make a profit.
Holland is one of the very few European countries
where a thriving hospital out-patient service exists.
Elsewhere in Europe out-patient departments are
regarded with hostility by non-hospital doctors as
l2
encroaching on their own territory.
In spite of the smooth running of the present
Dutch system, government involvement has
increased in recent years. On occasions it has inter-
vened where the private system seemed reluctant to
take on high risks, for example by legislating for full
compulsory cover of the chronic sick. There has
also been increasing financial involvement and a
growing concern for coherent planning at govern-
ment level to ensure even distribution throughout
the country of all medical resources. Exactly how
these aims will be executed is not yet certain, how-
ever.
Conclusion
Whether one opts for the social insurance system
of the original six members of the EEC or the state
system of the new three, it is fairly plain that no
system is without its problems. Nevertheless
throughout the Community a pattern emerges of
increasing state control to impose a fairer distribu-
tion of services, to restrain escalating costs and to
act as arbiter in the anarchic negotiations ofdoctors
and sickness funds. This does not necessarily mean
that other countries are inclined to embrace the
political ideology of the state system; in some coun-
tries there still remains a tendency towards the view
that illness is a financial risk like any other. Indeed
the whole question of private practice and socialjustice, a subject of hot debate in the UK, fails to
raise much protest in those other European coun-
tries where private medicine, resulting in different
standards of health care, is accepted.
In continental countries efficiency is the main
appbal of the state system. Apart from ensuring
more even distribution of services, and saving on
the separate administration of hundreds of sickness
funds, the state is seen as the only institution which
can counteract the monopolistic stranglehold of the
medical profession. If the state is the sole buyer of
services it has much greater bargaining power with
the sole sellers, i.e. the doctors, than individual
insurance funds could ever have. Alan Maynard
presents this argument convincingly in New Society
(28.8.75) and suggests that this is one reason why
British expenditure on health care may appear rela-
tively low compared with other European coun-
tries. However, he also points out that state control
of the market may exert its own stranglehold,
resulting in a brain drain and nurses' strikes. The
state can exert a similar hold over drug companies
which may be led, by reduced profits, to restrict
further medical research.
Certainly the state system is not necessarily a
panacea for all ills; it brings with it the problems of a
vast monolithic organisation. How to be effective at
national, regional and local level and how to
respond to the dictates of government on the one
hand and the voice of the consumer on the other,
have been questions taxing the British health ser-
vice in recent years. The combination of limited
resources and ever-increasing demands also pre-
sents major problems, requiring the state to choose
priorities in health care rather than offering a truly
comprehensive service.
At a time when rapidly rising costs pose very
severe threats to the operation of health services in
all European countries, governments are being
forced to take action to protect their health care
systems. Regrettably, the combined experience of
members of the European Community fails to sug-
gest an easy answer to the problem.
Poverty
With the possible exception of Denmark, all countries agree that the expan-
sion of social welfare benefits has not eradicated poverty in the Community. A
dffirent kind of approach is needed to help those who are still excludedfrom the
EEC's growing prosperity. Under the auspices of the Community's Action
Against Poverty Programme, member states have come together to investigate
the causes of today's poverty and to suggest effective remedies to endit.
Proqress and Povertv
The- social security and he-alth care boom of
recent years is held dp as a sign of European pro'
gress; social expenditure is an ever increasing pro-
portion of GNP, more and more groups of peo-ple
have been sheltered under the social welfare
umbrella, and protection in theory covers everyone
from the cradle to the grave. [n spite of seemingly
extensive provision, the European consciousness
has in recent years woken up to the fact that pov-
erty has not after all been eliminated. Furthermore
the numbers of poor people are too large to be
quietly ignored. Estimates for the Community as a
*trote put the figure at an alarming ten million peo-
ple "who do not have acceptable material means,^sufficient intellectual resources, or opportunities
allowing them to dominate their environment, to
face up to other people, in other words to possess
an identity and see this accepted by others."
The numbers of poor vary substantially from
country to country. In Ireland 24 per cent of the
population are thought to be below the poverty line,
in Belgium about 10 per cent, while in the UK the
official estimate of people entitled to supplementary
benefit is 9 per cent of the total population' But
even in wealthy Germany the number of those out-
side the ordinary prosperous community is substan-
tial 
- 
up to 800,000 homeless, up to 100,0ffi Yug-
rants, 10,000 drug addicts and 1,200,000 actual or
potential alcoholics. While large numbers of the
boor in all European countries are supported by
iocial welfare provision, the persistance of poverty
clearly indicates that this mechanism is inadequate
to wipe it out. Consequently countries have been
looking beyond existing measures of material assis-
tance io reach a better understanding of the root
causes of poverty, to see why people fail to take
advantage of the benefits available and to discover
effective remedies.
The Poverty Programme
The various threads of this activity have been
drawn together at Community level under the
EEC's ACtion Against Poverty Programme. This
represents a new departure for Community social
policy in that it is the first programme.concerned
with groups of people in a purely social context
rathei than as cogs in an economic machine. It is
also a new departure for the member states, who
are not in the habit of getting together to discuss and
compare national social policies.
Tlie object of the programme is to fund a number
of pilot- projects throughout the Community
designed to explore new ways of combating pover-
ty, ind to provide a pool of knowledge and exper-
tise on which all member states can draw. It is pos-
sible that from this may grow commonly shared
views of the nature of poverty and a joint approach
to its solution.
This has not been the case to date. The initial
discussions which formed the basis for the Poverty
Programme in 1974 revealed wide-ranging attitudes
both to the cause and extent of poverty and to
methods of tackling it. To start with, countries have
different ideas about the very definition of poverty.
In Denmark the poor are all those earning less than
half the average income. Other countries also
accept a relative definition, though they may gear it
diffeiently, but in some the idea still persists that
poverty depends not on the wealth ofthe rest ofthe
Community, but on the idea of a fixed minimum
subsistence level or "poverty line". Throughout
the EEC there is widespread acceptance of the view
that poverty refers both to a shortage of cash and
other material goods, and also to a lack of intangible
benefits, such as access to education, health and
amenities, and the power to control one's own
destiny.
These deficiencies, both material and intangible,
result in exclusion from ordinary society. In fact,
the Poverty Programme defines the poor as "an
individual or family whose resources are so small as
to exclude them from the minimum acceptable way
of life of the member state in which they live".
Many of the projects finally chosen under the pro-
gramme havsas a common theme the social reinte-
gration of the poor, and aim to give them an
accepted place in the local community, together
with the rights and responsibilities which that posi-
tion brings.
Both financial and socio-cultural factors are at
work in the social isolation of the poor, but coun-
tries have different ideas as to which item is the
chiefcause ofpoverty. Strikingly, countries such as
Denmark, Germany and Holland have expressed
the view that they have wiped out the financial
causes of poverty 
- 
inadequate benefits, low
incomes and so forth 
- 
and that the next step is to
tackle the hard core of social problems. For Italy,
Ireland and the UK, on the other hand, the financial
hurdle still looms large.
The differentiation between economic and social
poverty also gives rise to a curious separation of
responsibility on the part of governments. The exis-
tence of widespread poverty as a result of inade-
quate financial benefits puts the ball firmly in the
government's court to improve services and
inprease take-up of benefits through welfare rights
programmes. On the other hand countries have
ieacted in very different ways to the social circum-
stances of poverty. In the reports submitted by
member governments during initial discussions on
the Poverty hogramme, Germany, for example,
expressed concern about peripheral groups such as
vagrants, gypsies, drug addicts and convicts, and
described ways in which the state was taking action
to get these various groups back on the road to
supporting themselves. France, rather than select-
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ing particular deviant groups, laid the emphasis on
the family unit. The principal French approach,
which runs along the lines of Sir Keith Joseph's
cycle of deprivation theory, sees poverty as being
handed on from generation to generation, and the
main means of tackling it being to intervene with
family aid, casework and child care to break the
cycle. While France and Germany are both ready to
intervene with policies to support particular groups,
there seems to be the implicit idea that the poor in
these cases are responsible for their own condition,
rather than the idea that it is the structure of society
that has made them what they are.
The Dutch approach, on the other hand, is to
accept that the social structure is as much to blame
for the persistence of poverty as the various de-
prived groups themselves. According to the Dutch
ethic everyone should have equal access to ade-
quate income, education and so forth, but groups
such as the elderly, the handicapped, migrants and
the low paid will need extra help if they are to be
offered genuine equality.
Tackling poverty within a community setting
seems very much the hallmark of social action in
the Netherlands, (although there are also policies
aimed at eradicating the personal problems of par-
ticular deprived groups). The UK also has increas-
ingly adopted a community wide approach, as the
growth of the urban aid programme, educational
priority areas and community development projects
illustrates. In fact Britain and the Netherlands are
the two countries where community work plays a
key role as a method of social intervention. Within
the UK section of the Poverty Programme itself, a
fair slice of aid has gone to community action pro-jects and community resource centres.
A keynote of many projects chosen under the
programme is the accent on self help. Deprived
groups within the Community will draw up and exe-
cute their own projects, ranging from family day
care centres in the UK and groups for the homeless
in Germany, to community action groups in France
and the Netherlands. The idea is that poor people
should bring about their own social integration and
acceptance within the surrounding community.
While the Poverty Programme has given its bles-
sing to a wide variety of projects concerned with
community development or with the social and
psychological needs of particular groups, there is a
notable absence, even in the poorer countries, of
projects concerned with the financial aspects of
poverty. In their original reports the member gov-
ernments were at pains to stress the adequacy of
their social security measures, and the comprehen-
sive range of social assistance available for those
not eligible for social security. As illustrated above,
social and psychological factors were largely
blamed for the persistence of poverty. No govern-
ment seemed particularly keen on the idea that one
reason for continuing poverty might be that people
were not claiming the benefits to which they were
entitled. While welfare rights are considered crucial
on this side of the channel, particularly where vol-
untary organisations are involved, they are not con-
sidered so important on the continent, where the
stigma and disincentive attached to means-tested
benefits, and the shortage of information on them,
appear to rouse less concern. In fact, Germany
seems more concerned with preventing people from
getting benefits they don't need than encouraging
them to apply. Candidates for social assistance may
have to pay it back if they are 'to blame' for their
situation, and one of the German projects is con-
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cerned with stopping the flow of benefits to the
un-needy as a way of combating increasing social
welfare demand. Out of the twenty-six projects
chosen under the Poverty Programme, only one
Irish project is concerned with welfare rights. This
is in spite of the vehement protests of the British
voluntary movement, which insisted that welfare
rights were a key instrument in alleviating financial
poverty and a vital contribution to the Programme.
While there may be certain gaps in the Poverty
Programme, most countries seem to agree that the
pilot projects now being set in motion will, although
operating on a small scale, supply important infor-
mation on the inadequacies of provision for the
poor and suggest appropriate remedies. Only
Denmark has shown relatively little interest in the
problem, claiming that poverty in Denmark has
been virtually eliminated. The Danish philosophy of
universal and uniform state benefits and its history
of harmonious industrial development have, it
would seem, produced a homogeneous community
within which there are no isolated groups and no
real poverty. Voluntary organisations, while play-
ing an invaluable role in combating poverty else-
where in the EEC, particularly in the UK, lreland
and the Netherlands, are thought to be superfluous
in Denmark, where the existing services are entirely
adequate. Denmark may be fortunate, but the rest
of the Community will need to work hard to eradi-
cate the poverty within its midst if it is to shake off




l. A group ofvoluntary organisations from various parts
of the country will collaborate on a Family Day Centre
project which seeks to experiment with different ap-
proaches to the task of helping the poorest families
to counter the particular deprivations of extreme
poverty 
- 
depression, sense of hopelessness, and
social and cultural isolation. The organisations con-
cerned are: London Council ofSocial Service; Ginger-
bread, Croydon; Aide ir Toute D6tresse; Defoe Day
Care Project Committee; Cambridge House and
Talbot; Camden Family Service Unit; Liverpool
Personal Service Society.
2. The Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation (Lisbon) is set-
ting up an Area Resource Centre in the United
Kingdom which will be located in a major city with
areas ofdeprivation. The centre will help field workers
and local groups, particularly self-help neighbour-
hood groups, with technical aid and equipment, and
advice.
3. The South Wales Anti-Poverty Action Cente, which
is a consortium of local groups combating depriva-
tion, are setting up a multi-purpose resource centre.
The resource centre will employ a lawyer, community
worker, and a research and development officer.
4. Two projects concerning the Edinburgh area are being
organised by lhe Craigmillar Festival Society and the
Lothian Regional Council. The Craigmillar project is
an attempt by the people themselves ofthis poor area
of mainly public housing to tackle and solve its physi-
cal and social problems. The Lothian project aims at
combating poverty within the areas of Edinburgh
where it is most concentrated. It is intended that
the work should not be confined to a separate pro-
gramme, but that its aims and methods should become
part of overall local government policy.
5. The National Association of Citizens' Advice Bureaux
plans to improve the effectiveness of its services in
giving advice and information about the rights of ap-
peal to social sescurity tribunals and in organising the
provision of lay advocates to appear before these
tribunals.
6. The Northern lreland Department of Health and
Social Services plans two surveys studying firstly the
extent to which government and other services are
being utilised in the fields of housing, health and
education, and, secondly, the part playetl by voluntary
organisations in meeting social needs.









The economic recession marked an abrupt end to the laisser-faire attitudes of
member states to the migrants in their midst. While governments hastily imposed
immigration bans to protect their own nationals from increasing unemployment,
the Commission was left with the task of campaigning for better conditions for the
large numbers of migrant workers already resident in Europe. The protectiorl pf
intia-Community migrants is not too great a problem since they are covered by
the Treaty of.Rome. Migrant wo*ers from outside the Community are in a m-uch
more precarious position. The Commission will have to fight hard to get them
accepted as equals.
Caught by change
Migrant workers were the answer to the em-
ployer's prayer in the labour-hungry boom years of
the fiftiei and sixties. They flooded into the rich
parts of Europe from elsewhere in the Community,
and further afield, providing an invaluable source of
cheap labour, boosting growth rates, keeping down
wage levels and performing those poorly paid,
unfleasant jobs which the indigenous population
was beginning to find unacceptable. Because they
were only supposed to be temporary workers, the
host countries followed the line of economic oppor-
tunism, and quietly ignored any question of their
social and political rights, or even basic housing and
education needs.
By the early 1970's however, migrant workers
were making their presence felt 
- 
their numbers
swelling to the proportions of a so-called 'tenth
member state'. There are now thought to be at least
ten million non-Community migrants in the EEC,
reaching a possible fifteen million if those here
illegally and migrant workers from elsewhere in the
Community are included.l Host communities began
to show rapidly decreasing tolerance towards mig-
rant workers as the recession deepened. lncreas-
ingly they were felt to be less a boon than a burden,
making growing demands on the services and
goodwill of the host country.
Some irony attaches to this view of migrants as
parasites on the host country for, seen another way,
the rich countries had in fact been sucking the life
blood from poorer countries by taking on migrant
labour in the first place. The rich countries have
argued that they have done poor countries a service
by absorbing people they could not employ and
rdturning highly skilled workers a few years later,
workers-whb brought with them, moreover, val-
uable foreign currency. But it is arguable that richer
EEC countries have in general taken the most
promising and adventurous workers from other
poorer countries, have benefited from their educa-
iion without having to pay for it themselves, have
profited from their labour without giving them
decent wages, social benefits, or any political rights
and far from offering them job security have
threatened to take away their residence permits
when they fall unemployed.
In any event, the oil crisis of 1973 and the subse-
quent recession meant that the extra labour was no
longer wanted, thus providing host governments
with a good excuse for clamping down on immigra-
tion ancl soothing their own nationals.
I It is sme comfort to be remrnded that mass mlgratrom tre nothrng new, even ln
relatively recent tlmes. A census rn 1907 showed nearly 600,000 foreign workers in
Germany, whrle in 1930 there were sme 3,000,000 forerSnen hvrng and working in
France. Britain lost the same number through mrgmtion between l87l and 193 I, but took
rn 700,00 Irrsh in 185 I alone, followed by ltalims and some I 20,000 East Europem Jews.
A simrlar number of Poles stayed after the Second World War.
Shutting the doors
Germany imposed an import ban on non EEC
foreign workeri from November 1975, and those
migrant workers remaining found it increasingly dif-
ficult to renew their work permits where they were
thought to be competing for jobs with German
nationals. ln 1975laws were introduced to impose
strict penalties on illegal immigration, and to bring
about a more even regional distribution of migrant
workers. One after another, major West German
towns closed the door to immigrants. Munich,
Frankfurt, Hanover and West Berlin have now been
followed by Cologne. They are applying a ruling
passed in April 1975 which allows towns to do this
once their immigrant population includes more than
L}per cent of the total. EEC citizens are, however,
exempt (it would be against the Treaty of Rome).
The measure is aimed at the growing colonies of
Turks and Yugoslavs in Germany. German recruit-
ing agencies in the labour exporting countries were,
extept in ltaly, closed. By September 1975, there
were still 2,100,000 foreign workers in Germany,
500,000less than before the oil crisis. Migrants have
been particularly vulnerable to unemployment; at
the end of last year they accounted for 9 per cent of
the German labour force, but for 11.85 per cent of
the unemployed.
In France, a provisional halt to immigration was
called in 1974 and then extended throughout 1975.
Families of migrants have, however, been allowed
to settle again since last July. Efforts to stop illegal
immigration have increased, but whereas originally
illegal migrants were given the chance to regularis-e-
their position, they now risk being thrown out if
discovered. France has combined its restrictions
with attempts to improve the conditions of existing
migrants, -by action on housing and training
fac-ilities. The big bidonvilles (shanty towns) around
Paris have been bulldozed, though only to be
replaced by the ruthless exploitation of the mar-
chands de sommeil, who rent beds by the hour.
Belgium has also tried to cut down on illegal
immigiation, while legalising the position_ of those
already in the country. Legalisation has, however,
led to a new wave of illegal migrants, who won't be
treated so generously. The ban on immigration
began in 1974 and continued in 1975; it applies to all
non-BBC workers except the highly skilled. The
Belgians have been more imaginative in their family
polity, even paying half of the fares for families tojoin immigraht workers in Belgium. Housing is
above average, racial tension low, and Belgian
trade unions have done more than Dutch, French or
German, to make the foreign workers feel wanted.
While continuing to allow free entry from other
Scandinavian countries, Denmark has excluded all
other non-Community immigrants since November
15
1973. Refusing to renew work permits is another
way of restricting numbers2.
Luxembourg and the Netherlands have been slow
to impose a complete import ban, although Luxem-
bourg is now only opening the door to highly quali-
fied workers. The Netherlands has no immigration
ban as such, but has in the last two years imposed a
very strict interpretation on regulations governing
the issue of work permits and lets in workers only
from countries with recruitment agreements when
there are jobs going which Dutch manpower could
not cover. In recent months the major problem has
been the influx of immigrants of Dutch citizenship
from Surinam. The Dutch seem to have exhausted
themselves with their national effort to integrate
300,000 Dutch Indonesians in the 1950s. The esti-
mated 120,000 Surinamese who poured in mainly in
1974 and 1975 have fared less well, and relatives of
Mediterranean immigrants have been discouraged.
The poorest Community countries, Italy and Ire-
land, don't of course face these problems except, as
it were, in reverse, being exporters of labour. The
new legislation of the rich countries does not apply
to trish and Italian migrants as EEC law forbids any
restriction to free movement of labour within the
Community. In any case, intra-Community migra-
tion, accounting in 1960 for three quarters of the
total foreign labour force in the EEC, is now
responsible for less than a quarter.
In Britain the problem is one of immigration
rather than migration. The number of Common-
wealth citizens coming to Britain has vastly out-
weighed the few from such countries as Turkey,
Yugoslavia, Greece, Portugal, Algeria and Moroc-
co, who make up the bulk of migrants on the conti-
nent. While some continental countries may still
view their migrant populations as a temporary
phenomenon, it is accepted in Britain that immi-
grants come here to stay as British citizens. Conse-
quently Britain is heavily involved with questions of
racial equality and social integration, whereas
across the channel migrant labour has until recently
been viewed simply as an economic device, and it
has taken longer for governments to realise the
social and political side effects of their migration
policies.
This is not to say that Britain has not benefited
economically from immigrant labour, for indeed it
has. But in Britain immigration restrictions were
imposed to avoid racial conflict, leaving certain
industries, such as transport, badly understaffed.
The continental countries, on the other hand,
clamped down for economic reasons because there
were no jobs for migrants, or their own nationals, to
do.
Now, however, the whole of Western Europe is
paying increasing attention to the long term social
questions raised by the existence of a foreign work
force. It is already clear that in spite of immigration
bans, migrant workers won't quietly disappear in a
puff of smoke. Numbers are still vast and workers
are being joined by their families and having chil-
dren. These children will have different ideas about
going back to a country they have never seen. The
workers themselves are also not keen to go, in spite
of various financial inducements, knowing they
may never be given a chance to return.
2 A reportin Wslor noted that forergn workers do not hesltate to get marned to renew a
resrdencepermltorworkrngpermlt InDenmarkmoreandmoreYugoslavsandTurksare
marrying Danrsh grrls Nine trmes out of ten, the bnde does not go off uth her husband
after the ceremony. She vanrshes 
-after recervrng'compensaton' averagrng some.f400
l6
Can the Community help?
Better conditions for migraht workers have there-
fore become an urgent and long term necessity, but
one which the various governments whether willing
or not, have found difficult to sell to their electo-
rates. For this reason member states have looked to
intervention at Community level to help them out.
When it comes to the crunch however, member
states are less keen to act on the Commission's
recommendations. The particular stumbling block
is the difference in attitude to Community and
non-Community migrants. The Commission has not
tried to suggest that the two groups should be
allowed the same freedom of movement; simply
that non-Community migrants, once resident,
should be given the same rights as the others.
Member states on the other hand are less keen on
the idea, particularly when it comes to political
rights, which they argue are outside the Commu-
nity's brief.
In general, workers from within the Community
are already entitled, under existing legislation, to
move freely throughout the Community and to be
treated equally with nationals regarding employ-
ment, social security, living and working condi-
tions, trade union rights, their children's education
and the right to bring their families with them.
Non-Community migrants on the other hand are at
the mercy of the individual requirements of each
member state' and any bilateral agreements it
may have with their own country. They have no
automatic right to any of the benefits granted to
Community migrants.
The Community's Action Programme for migrant
workers and their families, now approved by the
Council of ministers, envisages improving the con-
ditions of Community migrants, particularly in the
field of employment and social security, and gradu-
ally extending all their benefits to migrants from
third countries. It also underlines the importance of
civic and political rights.
The Programme as such does more to enumerate
the problems facing migrant workers than to pro-
duce any precise remedies, but the Commission has
promised more detailed proposals on specific prob-
lems. A draft directive on the education of migrant
workers' children is already on the Council table.
This is designed to ensure that migrant children
have adequate reception facilities in their new
schools; that they continue to use their mother ton-
gue and learn about their own culture as well as
learning the language of the host country; and that
teachers are trained to cope with their special prob-
lems. (See E.S.T.S.22.) Also in the pipeline are
proposals on illegal immigration, on co-ordination
of migration policies and on consultative organisa-
tions for migrants.
While the Programme so far has mainly been
concerned with improving conditions of migrants
resident in the EEC the Commission tends to take a
global view of the situation, bearing in mind not
only economic and social factors in the host coun-
try, but also the consequences for the donor coun-
try. There is increasing support for the view that the
protection of migrant workers should be only one
aspect of a comprehensive policy of aid towards
developing countries. Policies are now needed
which will not merely act as palliatives to ease
social tensions within the wealthy nations of
Europe, but will break the vicious circle by ending
the need to emigrate.
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TOTAL POPULATION IN MAIN AGE GROUPS(total for each year : INY)
Age GroupsGl9 2G@ 55 and over
HOUSING
There are not enough houses to go round, and there probably never will be. As quantitative
changes cope with the minimum demands for putting a roof over everyone's head, demands for
better quality housing make existing stock obsolescent if not obsolete. The quantity of
housing stock in each Community country has been affected by the date at which rapid indus-
trialisation began, by such recent events as the Second World War (which destroyed proport-
ionately more houses in some countries than in others), and by the priorities of government
policy 
- 
the French, for example, concentrated on rebuilding the economy and further rapid
industrialisation rather than meeting the demand for housing quickly.
The National Building Agency (1973) Survey gives much information about
housing provision within the European Community. This covers each state
individually, and deals with owner-occupiers, provision by the state,
building societies, housing associations, new and old houses, flats and rents,
giving an ovcrall picture of the main characteristics ofeach country's housing
situation. One thing that emerges clearly is that the scope for harmonisation
by the Community is large if the political will exists to make good European











1960 to 1973 per thousand population
dwellings built
before 1945
1960 t973 1960 1973
Belgium 66% so% 77% 48% 24% 64% 27% 52,O00 ffiifffil s4 75
Denmark 47% 47% 97% 9l7o 63% 63% 78% 45,000 ffie3 76 63
France 43% 42% e379 s3% 49% 46% 36% 550,000 83 77
W. Germany 34% 35% 98% 83% 64% so% 30% 535,000 ffir.z 54 49
Ireland 60% 647o 57% 54% 33% 74Vo 4% 12,000 ffi)ffiIo' 80
Italy 537o 46% 72% 90% 29% 20% t8% 303,000 []]mtm'm'mf{'? s 7
Luxembourg 6A% 5SVo 99Vo 82% 46% 83% 51% 1,800 * ilirmilnfmlfit'1 
s 3. 75





ee% 98% 84% 78% t5% 396,000 ffi7.2 76 6t



























Belgium Denmark W. Germany Itdy Luxembourg Netherlands
SOCIAL E)GENDITURE AND NATIONAL INCOME (in annual average rates)
Socid
expenditure
1970-1972 14.6 t6.7 12.4 13.5 17.8 18.0 13.2 19.5 13.8




L970-1972 tt.2 10.5 11.8 9.6 t6.2 10.3 6.9 13.0 12.4
1973-1975 13.6 L2.0 12.8 8.9 20.2 15.1 9.5 12.5 16.6
N .wN S[*Rir W $Mi&
Belgium Denmark France W. Germany Ireland Itdy Luxembourg Netherlands UK
EXPENDITURE PER HEAD (in units of
Belgum Denmark France W. Germany Ireland ltaly Luxembourg Netherlands UK
BENEFIT BY FUNCTION (as % of total beneffts)


















The average life expectation ofpeople born in 1970




xfigures for 1960 only
tonly 1.970 figures available
France W. Germany lreland+ Italyt Netherlands UK





{5,111,ooo,ooo w. Germany 7.4%
#l,ooo,ooo lreland 2.9%
t2,014,0OO,000t Italy 5.2%
d33,ooo,ooot t Luxembourg 8.9%
{629,000,000 Netherlands 4.8%
#,9gg,ooo,ooo uK 4.0%












EoThe items and services included in health expenditure vary
from country to country therefore the figures in this chart
are only roughly comparable between countries.
HEALTH CARE
Doctors per 100,000 inhabitants 
- 
at the end ofthe year
f54 :'?&''s 'i[g].' 10?. :*q&'.:
164 L63 t4t 184 118 193 108 136 133
Pharmacists per 100,000 inhabitants 
- 
at the end of the year
.' sgt. .'?$ :'40 );{$f$:1
77 40 53 38 53 68 47 8 31
Hospital beds* per 10,000 inhabitants 
- 
at the end of the year
;;,8.6'
.,..r#. 'ii:lo? .1960:,













EMPLOYED IN THE COMMUNITY*
Country of employment
ryCount
of oru Belgium Denmark France W. Germany Ireland
*figures shown are taken from l97t-1973
AS A PERCENTAGE OF WAGE
AND SALARY EARNERS
35.0%
* Provisional (communicated by national experts) 
- 
excluding
Commonwealth workers holding UK passport. The 1971
census of population showed that 9o of the labour force
were born in the Commonwedth.
Italy Luxembourg Netherlands UK TotalEEC











* Bmployment of foreign workers issucd with their fust wmk-permits.
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1782000 ,2345254 t2t 568 1 666005
7.1%
4.1%
l.8Vo
r.3%
3.4%*
If,
- 5',(),il

